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PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS OF A GRIEVANCE
ARBITRATION CLAUSE: ANOTHER QUESTION
OF ARBITRABILITY
RECENT Supreme Court decisions 1 in the field of labor arbitration call for
a reappraisal of existing decisions defining the extent to which courts rather
than arbitrators should decide questions involving the procedural require-
ments of the grievance process. Almost all collective bargaining agreements
today provide for arbitration as the last step in the adjustment of grievances. 2
Two limitations on the arbitrator's power to hear grievances are commonly
incorporated into collective agreements. The terms of the arbitration clause
in some degree limit the subject matter which the arbitrator can consider.3
The arbitration clause also establishes more or less definite procedures which
a party wishing to submit a dispute to arbitration must follow.4 Both the
subject matter and the procedural limitation may be raised defensively,
either in an action to compel arbitration or before the arbitrator himself, in
an attempt to preclude an arbitral decision on the merits.5 When "arbitra-
bility" is challenged in a judicial proceeding, the court must determine how
far it can delve into the issue of arbitrability without transgressing on the
arbitrator's authority to interpret the agreement. The Supreme Court has
substantially clarified this issue recently with regard to subject matter arbi-
trability.6 The role of the courts in determining procedural arbitrability re-
mains unsettled.
The first post-Lincoln Mills 7 case to deal with a question of procedural
1. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960). See also United Steelworkers
v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
2. Ninety-four per cent of collective bargaining agreements provide for arbitration
of grievances which arise under them and which the parties are unable to settle them-
selves. 2 BNA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS ff 51:7 (1960).
3. Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARv. L. REv. 1482, 1509-10 (1959).
4. E.g., "Time limits for a request of arbitration are frequently imposed. These vary
widely from a few days to several months." 2 BNA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIA-
TIONS AND CONTRACTS [ 51:281 (1959). It is usually required at some point in the
grievance procedure that the grievance be put in writing. Id. at 1 51:21. "More rarely,
some rules may be specified concerning the obligations of the parties with respect to in-
vestigations to clear up disputes." Ibid.
5. See Wellington, Judge Magruder and the Labor Contract, 72 HARv. L. REv. 1268,
1286-89 (1959).
6. ABA Subcommittee on Labor Arbitration Law, Labor Arbitration in the Federal
Courts, 15 ARB. J. (n.s.) 113 (1960); see Hays, The Supreme Court and Labor Law,
October Term, 1959, 60 COLUU. L. REv. 901, 919 (1960).
7. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). This decision in-
terpreted § 301(a) of The Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)
(1958), as placing judicial "sanctions behind agreements to arbitrate grievance disputes,"
353 U.S. at 456.
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arbitrability was Boston Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Insurance Agents Union.8
The union sought arbitration of its claim that an employee had been wrong-
fully discharged. It complied with the detailed time requirements set out in
the collective bargaining agreement for all steps in the grievance procedure
leading up to arbitration. But the agreement set no explicit time require-
ment for designating an impartial chairman of the arbitration board in the
event of disagreement between the parties' representatives. The union waited
eleven months. When the impartial arbitrator was finally appointed, the
company sought an injunction in a federal district court to prevent arbitra-
tion, on the ground that the union had failed to comply with all procedural
requirements. 9 District Judge Wyzanski interpreted the collective agreement
to the extent of finding an implied requirement that the party seeking arbi-
tration proceed with reasonable speed. Declining to decide the issue of
"reasonable speed," he directed the parties "to proceed expeditiously before
the Arbitration Board" in order to ascertain whether the union had acted
with reasonable diligence.' 0 Reviewing this decision on appeal, the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit looked to principles which it had developed in
an earlier case involving subject matter arbitrability."' Chief Judge Magruder
declared that when the aid of the court is sought to enforce an arbitration
promise, the court has an inescapable obligation to determine as a preliminary
matter "whether all the conditions precedent to arbitration have been ful-
filled."'1 2 The case was remanded to the district court to make this determina-
tion, thus foreclosing to the arbitrator the question of procedural arbitrability.' 3
Boston Mutual was followed by the Seventh Circuit in Brass Workers
Union v. American Brass Co.14 Article VII of the collective bargaining agree-
ment involved in that case set up the typical three step grievance procedure,
added an optional fourth step allowing either party to "call in the U.S. Depart-
ment of Conciliation," and contained a section stating:
The Company agrees that its action in making discharges for cause or
giving disciplinary layoffs, may be reviewed in arbitration, at the request
8. In the Matter of Jacobson, 161 F. Supp. 222 (D. Mass.), rev'd and remanded
sub norn., Boston Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Insurance Agents' Union, 258 F.2d 516 (1st Cir.
1958), 171 F. Supp. 125 (D. Mass.), aff'd per curiain, 268 F.2d 556 (1st Cir. 1959).
9. See 161 F. Supp. at 223.
10. Id. at 225-27.
11. The principles were developed fully in Local 149, Fed'n of Technical Engineers
v. General Elec. Co., 250 F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1957).
12. 258 F.2d at 522.
13. Judge Wyzanski found on remand that the union was not guilty of unreasonable
delay. 171 F. Supp. 125 (D. Mass.), aff'd per curiam, 268 F.2d 556 (lst Cir. 1959).
In view of the appellate court's insistence upon a final resolution of this issue by the
district court, the finding of reasonable time would seem to have been the law of the
case when it finally reached the arbitrator.
14. 172 F. Supp. 465 (E.D. Wis.), aff'd, 272 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
363 U.S. 845 (1960).
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of either party, but such request shall be made in writing within ten (10)
days after the Company's final answer in writing to the Union.'5
The only specific description of the procedure to be followed after a concilia-
tion attempt was contained in article VIII, the general arbitration article,
which provided that:
if either party gives notice of taking the matter to the Fourth Step, then
arbitration may be appealed within ten (10) days after it is determined
that no agreement can be reached by the Fourth Step.'0
15. Brief for the Appellant, Appendix p. 20, Brass Workers Union v. American Brass
Co., 272 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1959). The earlier steps in the grievance procedure were
described by Article VII as follows:
Grievance Procedure
Section 1. Should there be any complaint, controversy, or grievance involving the
terms of this Contract by an employee or the Union or the Company, the same
shall be handled in the following manner:-
1. Between the immediate foreman and the Union Steward in the division.
2. Between the Department Foreman and the Department Committee. At
this point, the grievance or controversy shall be reduced to writing on a blank
allowing for notations as to action or disposition. Copies of such form properly
filled out shall be given to both parties.
3. If the matter is not satisfactorily adjusted within a period of twenty-four
(24) hours after it reaches the second step, it may be taken up between the
Union Bargaining Committee and the Management of the Company ...
4. In the event that the parties are then unable to agree, either party or both
parties may call in the U.S. Department of Conciliation.
Section 2. Any employee discharged or suspended for disciplinary reasons shall
have the right to appeal to the Company, through the Union Bargaining Com-
mittee, for a review of his case, provided that such appeal is presented within
five (5) working days after such discharge or suspension. An employee laid
off or discharged shall be given a copy of his termination slip, which must show
the reason for layoff or discharge.
Id. p. 19-20.
More than nine out of every ten collective bargaining agreements outline the steps
to be followed in adjusting grievances. "Three-step procedures (not counting arbitra-
tion) are by a substantial margin the most common, appearing in 38 percent of all
contracts." 2 BNA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS ff 51:4
(1960).
16. The collective agreement also contained a typical subject matter arbitrability
clause, although this provision was not in issue in the instant case. See 272 F.2d at
855.
Section 3. Matters to be arbitrated shall be limited to the settlement of specific
claims arising out of the interpretation or application of the specific terms and
provisions of this Agreement. The Arbitration Board shall have no power to add
to, subtract from, or modify any of the terms of this Agreement. No question of
a change in the wage scale or differentials shall be subject of arbitration. Before
the submission of a grievance or dispute to arbitration, the Company and the Union
shall set forth in writing specifically the issue to be submitted to arbitration, and
the Arbitration Board shall confine its decision to such issue. It is understood
and agreed that only one issue at a time may be arbitrated, unless the parties
mutually agree to do otherwise.
Brief for Appellant, supra note 15, Appendix pp. 21-22.
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A dispute arose over the discharge of certain employees, and upon a failure
of the parties to resolve the dispute between themselves, the union requested
that the company join it in submitting the grievance to the Department of
Conciliation. The company refused by letter, stating that it did not consider
the discharges "illegal." Nevertheless, the Federal Mediation Service was
called in by the union; after contacting the company, however, the Service
reported by letter that it had found the company's position "firm." Fifty-three
days after the company's letter, and thirteen days after the Service's letter,
the union requested arbitration. The company refused to arbitrate, claiming
that its letter was a "final answer" under Article VII, or, alternatively, that
the Service's letter "determined that no agreement [could] be reached by the
Fourth Step" within the meaning of Article VIII, and pointing out that in
either case the union's request was late.17 In seeking a court order to compel
arbitration, the union argued principally that the question of procedural arbi-
trability was for the arbitrator, not the court, to decide.' 8 The federal district
court disagreed, relying on Boston Mutual.19 The court then held that the col-
lective agreement imposed specific time requirements as a condition precedent
to arbitration, that these terms did not appear "unreasonable or harsh on their
face," and that the union had failed to comply.2 0 The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed,2 1 explicitly approving of and relying upon the de-
cision in Boston Mutual.
Two recent Supreme Court cases dealing with subject matter arbitrability
cast doubt upon the correctness of the view taken in Boston Mutual and Brass
Workers. The first of these decisions, United Steelworkers v. American Mfg.
Co.,22 reversed a Sixth Circuit decision which had refused to order arbitration
of what it deemed a "frivolous, patently baseless" claim.23 The Court noted that
"when the parties have agreed to submit all questions of contract interpretation
to the arbitrator," the court's function is "confined to ascertaining whether the
party seeking arbitration is making a claim which on its face is governed by
the contract."' The second of these cases, United Steelworkers z. Warrior
17. Brief for Appellee, pp. 8-9, 15-18, Brass Workers Union v. American Brass Co.,
272 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1959) ; see 172 F. Supp. at 469-70.
18. Id. at 466-67. Brief for Appellant, supra note 16, pp. 10-17. The union relied on
Southwestern New Hampshire Transp. Co. v. Durham, discussed at notes 54-55 infra and
accompanying text, Insurance Agents v. Prudential Insurance Co., note 51 infra, and
Dunphy Boat Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 267 Wis. 316, 327, 64 N.W.2d
866, 872 (1954) ("if the original dispute is arbitrable, the merit of the defenses available to
the employer are to be considered in the arbitration proceedings").
The union also argued on the merits that the employer's letter was not a "final ans-
wer." 172 F. Supp. at 466. Brief for Appellant, supra note 16, pp. 17-19.
19. 172 F. Supp. at 469.
20. Id. at 470.
21. 272 F.2d at 854.
22. 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
23. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 264 F.2d 624, 628 (6th Cir. 1959).
24. 363 U.S. at 567-68.
[Vol. 70:611
PROCEDURAL ARBITRABILITY
& Gulf Nav. Co.,25 involved the interpretation of a collective bargaining agree-
ment which contained a general arbitration clause, but which, unlike the agree-
ment in American, also provided that "matters which are strictly a function of
management shall not be subject to arbitration."2 6 When the union charged
that contracting out maintenance work constituted a partial lockout in violation
of the collective agreement, the company pointed to the "function of manage-
ment" provision and contended that contracting out fell within this category.27
Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, acknowledged that arbitration
is a matter of contract and that a party cannot be required to submit to arbi-
tration any dispute unless it has agreed to do so. 28 But he also stressed the
special nature of the collective bargaining agreement and the appropriateness
of its interpretation by the arbitrator.29 In an attempt to give weight to this
latter consideration, Justice Douglas laid down a rule of construction which
would allow judges to find contractual authority for an order to arbitrate with-
out being forced to examine and interpret the collective agreement in detail.
In the absence of any express provision excluding a particular grievance
from arbitration, we think only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to
exclude the claim from arbitration can prevail, particularly where, as here,
the exclusion clause is vague and the arbitration clause is quite broad.30
25. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
26. Id. at 576.
27. See id. at 577.
28. Id. at 582.
29. Id. at 578-82. Justice Douglas relied extensively on Shulman, Reason, Contract,
and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARv. L. REv. 999 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Shulman],
and Cox supra note 3, in support of his conclusions in this discussion. A general listing
of the special characteristics of a collective bargaining agreement, drawn from Justice
Douglas's opinion and from the articles, includes:
(1) Whereas in the case of commercial contracts, "arbitration is the substitute for
litigation," in the collective bargaining situation, "arbitration is the substitute for indus-
trial strife." 363 U.S. at 578.
(2) The collective agreement is "a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases which
the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate.' Ibid., with reference to Shulman 1004-05.
(3) "One unique characteristic (of a collective agreement) is the number of people
affected." Cox, supra note 3, at 1490.
(4) "A collective bargaining agreement also covers a wide range of conduct and an
enormous variety of problems." Ibid.
(5) "A labor contract operates prospectively over substantial periods. . . . Not all
commercial contracts, but surely those which are most familiar, relate to a single trans-
action .... Since one can hardly foresee all the problems that will develop in an indus-
trial establishment within even a single year, more scope must be left for decisions made
in the course of performing the agreement' Id. at 1491.
(6) "The parties to a collective agreement share a degree of mutual interdependence
which we seldom associate with simple contracts. . . . When most parties enter into
contractual relationship they do so voluntarily, in the sense that there is no real compul-
sion to deal with one another, as opposed to dealing with other parties. This is not true
of the labor agreement." 363 U.S. at 580.
30. 363 U.S. at 584-85.
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The Warrior test does not require that the court finally determine arbitrability,
but only that the court satisfy itself that the dispute is not unequivocably barred
from arbitration. 31 The Court's attitude suggests that a judicial finding of sub-
ject matter arbitrability will not preclude the arbitrator from reaching an oppo-
site conclusion, because presumably the arbitrator will not be bound by the
same rule of strict construction. Thus, in Warrior, the dispute went to arbi-
tration because the Court did not regard the employer's interpretation as the
only possible reasonable construction of the collective bargaining agreement,
but that decision did not foreclose the arbitrator, construing the agreement in
greater detail, from agreeing with the employer that contracting out was not a
proper subject matter for arbitration.
The role of the courts in determining subject matter arbitrability, as set out
in American and Warrior, is decidedly narrower than the role assumed by the
Boston Mutual and Brass Workers courts in determining procedural arbitra-
bility. The majority opinions in American and Warrior, however, might be re-
garded as having no effect on the procedural arbitrability decisions, because
many of the reasons stated in the Court's decision seem applicable only to
problems of subject matter arbitrability. Justice Douglas reasoned that a
federal court should view with suspicion any attempt to entangle it in the
construction of "substantive provisions" of a collective bargaining agreement
in the name of interpreting the arbitration clause, because construction of
substantive provisions "necessarily comprehends the merits" of the dispute. 32
A court decision on the merits of a grievance dispute, he felt, usurped the
arbitrator's function.83 Overlap between the merits of the underlying dispute
31. Although Mr. Justice Douglas's opinion required "the most forceful evidence of
a purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration" in lieu of an express provision in the
agreement, 363 U.S. at 585, Mr. justice Whittaker, dissenting, pointed out that the union
had tried repeatedly, but unsuccessfully, to induce the employer to agree to the inclusion
of a provision prohibiting the employer from contracting out work. Id. at 587-88. Since
it is difficult to imagine any more forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude such claims
from arbitration, what sort of evidence would suffice, absent an express provision, is not
clear.
Perhaps management could persuade a court not to order the dispute to arbitration
if it could demonstrate that the subject matter of the dispute is ordinarily considered
outside the realm of joint union-management action, e.g., the company's financial policies
or over its selection of an advertising agency. A slight indication that this may be the
sort of evidence which the Douglas opinion had in mind may be gleaned from its refer-
ence to the frequency with which "contracting out" is the subject matter of arbitration dis-
putes. 363 U.S. at 584 n.8.
32. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 585 (1960).
Mr. justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion in the Anerican and Warrior decisions,
took what was perhaps a narrower view. He noted that were the arbitration clause quite
narrow, or the exclusion clause quite specific, a court would be "somewhat freer to
examine into the merits," since it then could be inferred that "the parties had mani-
fested a greater interest in confining the arbitrator." United Steelworkers v. American
Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 572-73 (1960).
33. Id. at 569.
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and the question of the dispute's arbitrability is almost unavoidable when sub-
ject matter arbitrability is involved. Under the typical arbitration clause
limiting the arbitrator to questions involving "interpretation and application"
of the collective agreement,34 the court must decide whether the agreement
contains a provision covering the subject in dispute; once the court has
found that the agreement does or does not contain such a provision, it has
resolved an issue central to the arbitrator's own decision on the merits.3 5 The
arbitrability question in Boston lutual and Brass Workers, however, involved
no overlapping, because the courts' findings on the issue of procedural com-
pliance had no impact on the merits of the underlying disputes.
The Court also stressed the necessity of preserving the arbitrator's func-
tion as an adjunct of the collective bargaining process. Mr. Justice Douglas
observed that a collective bargaining agreement covers many diverse situa-
tions, many people, and extends over a substantial period of time.36 The
draftsmen of a collective agreement, therefore, must leave gaps to be filled in
by reference to the industrial background out of which the agreement arose.3 7
Arbitration, which was described as "part and parcel of the collective bar-
gaining process itself," 3s is the means of resolving these unforeseen prob-
lems.39 It might be argued that this reason for judicial deference to the arbi-
trator is also limited to cases involving subject matter arbitrability. Pro-
cedural rules for grievance arbitration do not appear to be the kind of pro-
vision which must be developed over time through continuing bargaining by
the parties. They are rules of organization and orderly conduct, more a
matter of convenience than a reflection of the parties' economic relationship.40
A third leg of the Warrior decision which also seems inapplicable to pro-
cedural arbitrability questions is the Court's postulate that arbitrability is a
matter of contract, and that the intent of the parties must therefore be
honored.41 The Court found it could not decide questions affecting the merits
because the very nature of an agreement providing for arbitration as the final
step in adjusting grievances makes it inconceivable that the parties intended
for a court rather than the arbitrator to pass on the merits. It is less certain,
absent a provision allowing the arbitrator to decide arbitrability, that judicial
determination of a procedural question violates the parties' intent.
34. See, e.g., the provision quoted in note 15 supra.
35. See Wellington, supra note 5, at 1289; Summers, Judicial Review of Labor Arbi-
tration, 2 BUFFALO L. REv. 1 (1952).
36. See 363 U.S. at 578-80. See generally note 29 supra.
37. Id. at 580.
38. Id. at 578.
39. Id. at 581.
40. Contra, Cox, supra note 3, at 1510-11.
41. 363 U.S. at 566. Justice Douglas relied on Labor Management Relations Act
(Taft-Hartley Act) § 203(d), 61 Stat. 154 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1958), which
states:
Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is hereby declared to be
the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the applica-
tion or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement.
1961]
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There is, however, one important policy underlying the Warrior decision
which can be applied to the problems of procedural arbitrability. The Court
chose to defer to the arbitrator because, by virtue of his acquaintance with the
industry and shop practices constituting the environment in which the collec-
tive agreement was drawn up, the arbitrator is better qualified to settle disputes
arising under the agreement.42 The ambiguous nature of most collective bar-
gaining agreements, the Court reasoned, calls for this industrial expertness
to uncover the parties intent.43 Procedural provisions can be as vague as those
dealing with substantive matters.44 They also require interpretation by some-
one who can look behind the agreement to determine what the parties meant
by the term, whether strict application is reasonable in the industrial context,
what resolution is most acceptable to both parties, and which interpretation is
most suitable to the proper functioning of the arbitral process. The Court's
recognition of the arbitrator's special competence must be considered a tenet
of national labor policy relevant to the formulation of the federal common law
of labor contracts. 45 As applied to future cases dealing with procedural arbi-
trability, it would appear to require that courts follow a rule of construction
similar to the Warrior rule: unless the meaning and effect of the procedural
provision is unequivocal, the court should reserve final determination of these
issues for the arbitrator.
It may be objected that the Warrior rule should not be applied to pro-
cedural arbitrability cases on the basis of this single policy consideration
when the other policies underlying that decision are probably inapplicable
to issues of procedural compliance. But the fact that other policies are in-
applicable does not mean that such policies call for a contrary result. For
example, the observation that the parties' intent is unclear when procedural
issues, not touching on the merits of the dispute, are involved does not lead
to the conclusion that the parties want a court to decide such issues. It means
simply that speculation about the probable intent of the parties gives no
guidance at all. In this vacuum, the single policy recognizing the compe-
tence of the arbitrator deserves great weight. This is especially true when
the question before the court is the adoption of a rule of construction for
contracts. Whatever rule is adopted, the parties are not foreclosed from
contracting to reach the opposite result. Assuming, as is probable, that the
management generally desires judicial determination of arbitrability and the
union does not,4 6 the rule adopted is important only to the extent that it re-
42. See 363 U.S. at 581-82. See generally note 29 supra.
43. See 363 U.S. at 579-81.
44. The "reasonable time" issue in Boston Mutual is a sterling example. See text at
notes 8-13 supra.
45. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), charged the federal
courts with the responsibility of fashioning the substantive law to apply in suits under
§ 301 "from the policy of our national labor laws." Id. at 456.
46. This would seem to be the case since almost all arbitration claims will be brought
by the union. Shulman 1007. The employer will therefore favor the system which puts the
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quires one party to overcome a presumption against its viewpoint by inserting
its viewpoint, in explicit terms, in the agreement.
If the Warrior rule were applied to procedural arbitrability cases, the Bos-
ton Mutual doctrine would of course be superseded. The entire controversy
in that case, including the issue of whether the agreement contained an implied
"reasonable time" requirement, would be referred to an arbitral decision.47
The result in the Brass Workers case, however, might be reconciled with
the Warrior rule, for the court's finding that the procedural provisions in-
volved were unambiguous seems on its face to satisfy that test.48
The first post-Warrior decision dealing with procedural arbitrability ignored
the Boston illutual doctrine but in so doing it went even further in deference
to the arbitrator than the suggested rule of construction would require. In
Philadelphia Dress Joint Bd. of ILGWU v. Sidele Fashions, Inc.,49 the
employer contended that certain grievances were not arbitrable because the
union had ignored two of the steps in a three step grievance procedure. The
union admitted that it had not taken these intermediate steps, but contended
that an act of the company had made these steps impossible and that the
attitude of the company had made them futile. The district court noted that
the validity of the union's position depended upon facts which the affidavits
indicated to be in dispute.50 Since the union had moved for a summary judg-
ment ordering arbitration, the court concluded that it would have to deny
the motion if the facts in dispute were material to its decision. Summary
judgment was granted, on the ground that questions of procedural arbitra-
bility, unlike questions of subject matter arbitrability, were entirely for the
arbitrator,ri and therefore the disputed facts were not material.
greatest number of blocks in the way of a decision on the merits; with both the trial
judge and the arbitrator passing on issues of arbitrability, the chances of avoiding a de-
cision on the merits seem greater. Even if one or the other will decide the question com-
pletely, the repute of judges will probably make them seem more favorable to the em-
ployer. See Summers, supra note 35.
47. See Wellington, supra note 5, at 1288; Cox, sutpra note 3, at 1510 ("It is sub-
mitted that both [Boston Mutual] courts erred."). Cox can be interpreted, however, as
urging the submission of all procedural arbitrability questions to the arbitrator. See note
51 infra.
48. Whether the court in Brass Workers correctly interpreted the facts to reach this
conclusion might be open to dispute. The union could have argued: (1) the issue of
whether the company's letter constituted a "final answer" should have gone to the arbi-
trator (which the union argued implicitly), see note 18 supra, (2) the union "substantially
complied" w6ith the requirements of Article VIII, supra note 16, (3) the dispute was a
"continuing violation," see note 55 infra, (4) the requirements were "promises" rather
than "conditions precedent," see note 55 infra.
49. 46 L.R.R.M. 2894 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
50. Id. at 2895-96.
51. Judge Van Dusen pointed to two decisions by federal courts in the eastern dis-
trict of Pennsylvania as evidence of "ample lower court authority" supporting his position.
In both cases, United Cement Workers Union v. Allentown-Portland Cement Co., 163 F.
Supp. 816 (E.D. Pa. 1958), and Insurance Agents v. Prudential Ins. Co., 122 F. Supp.
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While the Sidele court's disregard of Boston Mutual seems proper in view
of the Warrior decision, its complete abandonment of the procedural arbitra-
bility question to the arbitrator appears contrary to the Supreme Court's de-
cision. The Court pointed out in Warrior that arbitration is a matter of con-
tract and that Congress has assigned to the courts the duty of determining
whether the recalcitrant party has breached its contractual promise to arbi-
trate.52 The feeling reflected in this policy seems to be that the parties to a
collective agreement should be able to bargain about the circumstances in
which arbitration will be invoked, come to whatever agreement on this matter
that they find mutually acceptable, and have the terms of arbitrability which
they select respected by a court. The Supreme Court restricted this freedom
to contract by imposing the requirement of explicitness, but it did not deny
the freedom itself. A party may not only wish to preclude arbitration of cer-
tain subjects. It may also wish to preclude arbitration of any grievance when
certain procedures are not followed in presenting it. It seems logical to con-
clude, therefore, that the federal courts should enforce this right whether the
parties choose to condition arbitration on the subject matter of the grievance
or on compliance with procedural prerequisites. The real issue for the court
is whether the party wishing to bar arbitration because of procedural non-
compliance has succeeded in drafting a procedural provision which satisfies the
"explicitness" test of Warrior.
Warrior requires arbitration in every case in which the arbitration clause
is susceptible of being interpreted to permit arbitration. A party seeking to
have the court rather than the arbitrator decide procedural arbitrability must
therefore consider how best to avoid such ambiguities in the agreement. Of
course, a court bent on sending a procedural question to the arbitrator will
probably have little trouble finding an ambiguity in the relevant clause no
matter how well it is drafted.53 The Warrior rule of construction is neces-
sarily directed to judicial discretion. But this fact does not undercut the
869 (E.D. Pa. 1954), the federal courts relied on Pennsylvania law to arrive at their
decisions. Although he noted "some language used by the Supreme Court in its recent
decisions," the judge also noted that the Court had relied on Cox, supra note 3, and quoted
the article to his own purposes:
Using the technical language of the law, I suggest that the conventional arbi-
tration clause limiting the arbitrator to disputes concerning "interpretation and
application" of the contract reserves the right to a judicial determination upon
whether the arbitrator has jurisdiction over the subject matter but that all other
questions-procedural, jurisdictional or substantive-are solely within the power of
the arbitrator to determine.
Cox, supra note 3, at 1511.
52. 363 U.S. at 582. The Supreme Court thus reaffirmed its holding in Lincoln Mills
that such an assignment is implicit in § 301(a). See notes 7, 45 supra. But see Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 460 (1957). (Frankfurter, J., dissenting
opinion).
53. For an example of courts reaching the opposite result by this type of "interpreting,"
see Summers, supra note 35, at 18.
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importance of careful drafting; it merely recognizes that, particularly in this
area, drafting cannot be foolproof.
One ambiguity which might be referred to the arbitrator is the question
of whether the party who fails to comply with the grievance procedure for-
feits all rights to arbitrate the grievance. In some factual situations, an arbi-
trator might find that a limited right to arbitration remains despite the non-
compliance. For example, in a recent state case5 4 the collective agreement
contained a provision requiring that any claim for its alleged violation must
be filed not later than twenty days after the date that the alleged violation
occurred or was first known to have occurred. Two employees did not pre-
sent their claims within twenty days of the initial violation of the agree-
ment. Instead of holding that this noncompliance barred the claim from
arbitration, the arbitrators treated each work week as a separate violation,
thus allowing the arbitration to proceed but limiting the back pay award to
a period within twenty days of the notices. Since permanent changes in
working conditions and many forms of employee discipline could also be
characterized as "continuing violations," any arbitration provision imposing
time requirements might be found ambiguous when the underlying grievance
involves such actions. G
Parties may attempt to eradicate this ambiguity by providing in the arbi-
tration clause that arbitration rights are totally forfeited by procedural non-
compliance. But there are two basic objections which may prove fatal to the
effectiveness of such a provision. First, if a provision of general applicability
is used, it would not be difficult for an arbitrator to conclude that the parties
could not have intended the severe result to apply in every instance, regard-
less of the nature of the underlying grievance, the character of the procedu-
ral requirement, or the extent of the deviation.56 Under the Warrior doc-
trine, a court need not make the final decision as to whether a clause is in-
54. Southwestern New Hampshire Transp. Co. v. Durham, 102 N.H. 169, 152 A.2d
596 (1959).
55. The "continuing violation" concept has been found useful in antitrust litigation to
circumvent statute of limitation problems not unlike the problem in Southwestern. For a
recent example, see United States v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586,
597-99 (1957).
Arbitrators might also use a distinction familiar to the common law of contracts to
arrive at the same result. The time requirement might be found a "mere promise" rather
than a "condition precedent." See generally 3A CORnIN, CONTRACTS § 633 (1960). If the
arbitrators in Southwestern New Hampshire treated the time requirement as a "promise,"
they would have allowed the company damages, by way of recoupment against the amount
the claimants would have recovered had their notice been timely. Recovery would be the
tame, since the employer's damages would be the amount for which he became liable be-
yond twenty days.
56. An example of such a situation is Livingston v. Tel-Ant Electronic Co., 23 LAB.
Am. REP. 672 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955). The collective agreement there contained a require-
ment that notice demanding arbitration must be submitted to the other party within 24
hours "after written notice has been given by either side to the other of the inability to
adjust." It also contained a "time is of the essence" clause. The employer, demanding ar-
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applicable to a given case in order to send the procedural issue to arbitra-
tion; it need only conclude that the clause is capable of being found so. Par-
ties would be well advised, consequently, to make explicit their intention by
relating the loss of arbitration rights to noncompliante with specific pro-
cedures established for specific types of grievances. When a court is faced
with a specific provision, related to a particular type of grievance, which
makes compliance with certain procedural requirements an absolute pre-
requisite to arbitration of that type of grievance, the court's respect for the
intent of the parties will probably make it reluctant to recognize the possi-
bility that such a clause will be found unduly harsh.
5 7
Even if the collective bargaining agreement succeeds in making explicit the
parties' intention to bar arbitration, a court must still order arbitration if it
finds a possibility that the noncompliance could be excused, usually by the be-
havior of the other party.58 This was the issue in the Sidele case. The union's
affidavits alleged that it was justified in ignoring two intermediate steps of the
grievance procedure because the company had made these steps impossible and
futile. The district ourt refused to consider this issue, referring it entirely to
the arbitrator as the proper tribunal to make the decision. Under W arrior,
however, a narrower rationale was available. The possibility that an arbitra-
tor would find this a valid excuse for the union's noncompliance would have
constituted sufficieut grounds for ordering arbitration. Of course, some excuse
can be offered for every failure to comply with procedural requirements. To
prevent complete abdication to the arbitrator on procedural issues, a court
will have to make a threshhold determination that the excuse offered is ten-
able, refusing to order arbitration when it is not.
bitration, failed to meet the twenty-four hour requirement. Passing on the procedural
objection, the court said,
I am of the view that under the circumstances of this case, the strict limitation of
twenty-four hours is unreasonably harsh and, in my opinion, unenforceable. It
seems to me that the employer here acted as expeditiously as possible.
Id. at 674. The time requirement in this case was probably included in the collective
bargaining agreement to expedite the processing of the ordinary grievance involving em-
ployee claims against the company. It is arguable that the parties did not intend it to
apply to the type of dispute involved in the case.
57. Corbin describes the way courts have handled apparently harsh conditions prece-
dent in ordinary contract silaations:
The courts do not hold such express conditions to be contrary to public policy,
however; they are not yet ready to limit our much prized freedom of contract so
greatly. Nevertheless, they are very ready to put an interpretation on a contract
so as to avoid a harsh condition.
3A CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 748 (1960). By tying specific procedures to particular types
of grievances, the scope for interpretation is narrowed.
58. A typical excuse might be waiver of the time requirement or some formality. See
Cox, supra note 3, at 1511.
